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REVIEW ESSAY
Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality
and Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law
Richard Delgado*
FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM. By
Derrick Bell. New York: Basic Books. 1992. xiv + 222 pp. $20.00.
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? By
Gerald N. Rosenberg. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1991. xii +
425 pp. $29.95.
TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT. By
David G. Savage. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1992. 473 pp. $22.95.
RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA. By Girardeau A. Spann. New York: New
York University Press. Forthcoming 1993 (manuscript on file with the
Stanford Law Review). 256 pp. $40.00.
INTRODUCTION: IN WHICH RODRIGO AND I COMMISERATE AND CATCH
Up wITH DEVELOPMENTS IN EACH OTHER'S LIVES
I was in my office late one afternoon, puzzling over how to incorporate
four recent books addressing the role of courts in protecting minority rights
into the next edition of my casebook. The first of these books, Derrick Bell's
Faces at the Bottom of the Well,' argues that racism is likely to prove a
permanent feature of America's cultural landscape.2 The "faces" are those
of African-Americans whose existence at the bottom of society enables even
the poorest whites to gain self-esteem. 3 Written almost entirely in the narra-
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado; J.D. 1974, University of
California at Berkeley.
1. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoroM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
(1992).
2. See also DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]; Derrick Bell, Foreword, The Civil
Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1985) [hereinafter Bell, Foreword].
3. Bell, p. v (frontispiece).
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tive mode, Faces recounts a series of imaginary tales, each illustrating a les-
son about racial justice.4 Although most of these lessons are bleak and
severe, Bell nevertheless exhorts readers to continue the struggle for racial
justice.
A second work, Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope,5 presents a cri-
tique of the role of the courts in producing social change. Although spon-
sored by a conservative foundation, the book purports to be an objective
assessment of courts' role and function. 6 Contrasting the view of the United
States Supreme Court as dynamic in producing social change with the view
that the Court is constrained in its ability to effect reform, Rosenberg con-
cludes that the latter is a more accurate depiction. 7 According to Rosen-
berg, courts produce little change that was not previously in motion and are
less effective in propelling reform than other extralegal forces such as market
pressures, technological changes, political action, and legislative reform."
Nevertheless, Rosenberg notes that courts are effective in blocking change.9
Race Against the Court, by Girardeau Spann,10 argues that the Court not
only is institutionally incapable of protecting minority rights but that it
serves to perpetuate majoritarian control.' In Spann's view, operational
and formal safeguards designed to insulate judicial decisions from political
pressure are insufficient to counter the influence of majoritarian socio-polit-
ical values.' 2 Indeed, often "the governing substantive principles of law
themselves incorporate majoritarian values in a way that leaves the Court
with no choice but to acquiesce in majority desires."' 3 Automatically taking
minority grievances to the judicial system creates a dependency relationship
with an increasingly unresponsive institution.14 Spann believes that the use
of other societal mechanisms, such as mass politics, demonstrations, and
state and local governments, would be more effective in producing racial
advances than judicial intervention.' 5
The last work, David Savage's Turning Right,16 considers the Supreme
Court's role in minority rights from the perspective of a Los Angeles Times
4. For example, in the first chapter, Bell illustrates society's preference for symbolic rather
than actual breakthroughs for African-Americans by recounting a conversation with a taxi driver.
Bell, pp. 15-32.
5. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991).
6. Rosenberg, p. xi.
7. Rosenberg, pp. 10-30, 35, 157-69, 175-227.
8. Rosenberg, pp. 42-71, 157-69, 175-227, 247-65, 292, 300-03.
9. See, eg., Rosenberg, pp. 85-102, 107-34 (discussing the possibility that Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 343 (1954), may have impeded the movement toward school integration).
10. GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND AI-
NORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript on file with the Stanford
Law Review).
11. Spann, pp. iv, 31-59, 180-272.
12. Spann, pp. 22, 37-43.
13. Spann, p. 30.
14. Spann, pp. 178-206.
15. Spann, pp. 146-75, 178-206, 219-20.




journalist. In a discussion which contains elements of the three above-men-
tioned theses, Savage focuses on the changes in the Court's composition and
ideology which accompanied the emergence of the current conservative ma-
jority.17 The books had quite disparate theses. I was getting nowhere in
figuring out how and where to incorporate them in my revision when a fa-
miliar lanky figure appeared as though by magic in my doorway.
"Rodrigo!" I exclaimed. "I'm glad to see you. Please come in." I
peered at him closely. The usually ebullient Rodrigo stood in my doorway,
looking down. "Is something wrong?"
"Well, as a matter of fact, yes. Do you have a minute? I tried phoning
first, but you were out."
"Of course," I assured him, gladly pushing the four books aside. A dis-
cussion with Rodrigo was always a welcome break from my work. Rodrigo
is the younger half-brother of civil rights activist Geneva Crenshaw.18 Born
in the United States, Rodrigo later moved to Italy where his father, an Afri-
can-American serviceman, was stationed. After graduating from the base
high school, Rodrigo received a scholarship from the Italian government
which enabled him to study world civilization and law at Bologna. Rodrigo
recently returned to the United States to prepare for a career in teaching law
and is currently pursuing an LL.M. degree at a law school in the same city
where I teach.19
Recalling Rodrigo's recent success in winning a national student writing
competition with his seminar paper on care and competition and his plans to
enter a paper on race in an upcoming contest sponsored by a conservative
organization,20 I began: "The last time we talked, things were going well for
you. You had won that writing prize and were hot on the track of a second
paper that sounded intriguing. Has school taken a turn for the worse?"
"Well, yes. And in a way, it has to do with the paper that I am working
on."
17. Savage's book deals with the Court's treatment of civil rights, the right to die, flag desecra-
tion, the death penalty, and other notable areas. Moreover, Savage's personal interviews with the
Justices enable him to give fascinating insights into the Justices' personalities and working styles.
The book ends with a description of the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings, Savage, pp. 423-50,
and a look forward at the Court's likely quietist role in social reform.
18. Geneva Crenshaw is a fictional character created by Derrick Bell. For additional back-
ground information on Rodrigo, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357
(1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle] (reviewing DINEsH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCA-
TION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS (1991)); see also Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's
Second Chronicle: The Economics of Politics and Race, 90 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1993) [here-
inafter Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle] (reviewing RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS
(1992)); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle." Care, Competition, and the Redemptive Trag-
edy of Race, 81 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle]
(reviewing ANDREWV HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNE-
QUAL (1992)).
19. Rodrigo's foil, "the professor," is also a fictional construct. As I have created him, he is a
middle-aged, male professor of color who teaches in a large law school in a major urban area.
Neither Rodrigo nor the professor is based on any single person, alive or dead.




"I'd like to hear about it. Can I offer you a cup of coffee? I have a new
coffeemaker."
"Yes, thanks. Oh-Giannina and I have one of those." Rodrigo ex-
amined my new gadget with interest. "We have the smaller version."
As I busied myself measuring the grounds and setting the switches, my
visitor inquired: "Does your law school have an annual 'libel show,'
Professor?"
"Yes. I think most do. Here, they're called the Follies-a little singing,
some bad dancing, and a lot of mockery of the professors.21 They're a good
way for students to let off steam, although the faculty sometimes grumble
over the irreverent way they are portrayed."
"We had something similar back in Italy, too. But the one they had at
my school this year set a new low. Half the skits were antifemale or antimi-
nority. One made fun of affirmative action; another, of gays and lesbians. A
third, perhaps the most tasteless of all, lampooned a gay scholar who had
died less than a year earlier of AIDS--even though her one-time lover and
young son were in the audience."'22
"In bad taste, to say the least," I commented. "Did anyone do anything
about it?"
"A number of students and several of the faculty complained and signed
a petition demanding action. But the administration did nothing. Several
faculty members sided with the students who produced the show. They said
that, despite the odiousness of some of the ideas expressed, it was free
speech."'2
3
"Reminds me of the position certain liberal organizations take on the
campus hate-speech controversy. They deplore racism and racist remarks
but throw up their hands and say there is little we can do because they in-
clude speech."
'24
"I know. But that's only the beginning. When the administration re-
fused to take action against those who put on the first production, my group
of nearly fifty LL.M. students decided to produce a show of our own. It was
a kind of counter-parody. We made fun of the original production, as well
21. Many law schools appear to have such annual programs.
22. A similar incident happened at Harvard Law School. For a discussion of the controversy
surrounding a lampoon issue of Harvard Law Revue, see David Margolick, In Attacking the Work of
a Slain Professor Harvard's Elite Themselves Become a Target, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 17, 1992, at B16,
B16. This controversy concerned the following article: Mary Doe, He-Manifesto of Post-Mortem
Legal Feminism (From the Desk of Mary Doe), 105 HARv. L. REVUE 13 (1992) (on file with the
Stanford Law Review) (the issue was subsequently withdrawn).
23. Compare Margolick, supra note 22, with Michele N-K Collison, Angry Protests over Diver-
sity and Free Speech Mark Contentious Spring Semester at Harvard, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 6,
1992, at A39, A39-40.
24. E.g., Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990
DUKE L.J. 484 (The author, national president of the ACLU, contends that racial insults are pro-
tected speech.). For an opposing perspective on this issue, argued on free speech and equal protec-
tion grounds, see, for example, Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Ruler Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343 (1991); Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431.
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as of a number of law school institutions, practices, and sacred cows. Many
of us are from foreign countries, so we chose targets that struck us as funny
about the U.S. or legal education here."
"And what happened?"
"There was a huge turn-out-probably as big as for the original event,
even though we didn't serve alcohol. The crowd loved it. We satirized the
Socratic method, recruiting season, casebooks with unanswerable questions,
ultraconservative student organizations, and professors who take seven
months to grade bluebooks that we write in three hours."
"Sounds inoffensive enough. How did this get you in trouble?"
"One of our skits poked fun at the law school for currying favor with
rich alumni. We called the skit "Blood Money" and acted it out to the mu-
sic of a popular tune. When word got out, one wealthy and well-known
donor rescinded his pledge to give the law school $3 million for a new li-
brary. The administration was furious. Several of us got letters formally
reprimanding us for conduct inimical to the institution. Others of us were
told informally that we had better not count on the school's help in getting
teaching jobs."
'25
"No small threat," I acknowledged. "If your program is at all like ours,
most of the LL.M.s are there because they want to become academics.
What's the point of getting the degree if you can't teach later?"
Rodrigo shrugged and then continued, "I couldn't help be struck by the
different treatment of the two programs. The first one was raunchy, mean-
spirited, and really pretty amateurish. Ours was much more light-hearted
and, if I may say so, literate. Giannina helped with the lyrics-as you may
know, she's a published playwright."
"No, I didn't know." Actually, I had not yet met Giannina, Rodrigo's
companion, and I was curious to find out more about her.
"So, the words were really funny. Swiftian, even Voltairean, in their
deftness. But it made no difference to the administration. We were all repri-
manded, and now I'm not sure I'll be able to get a job."
"Rodrigo, don't worry. You're a top graduate of a major law school,
and you have already won a national prize for student writing. You'll do
fine."
"I hope so," Rodrigo responded, a little uneasily. "But the whole busi-
ness got me thinking about neutrality and color-blindness in the jurispru-
dence of race.26 As you may recall, my second paper-the one I'm writing
for that other contest-"
25. Several recent articles note the importance of mentors in encouraging the advancement of
students of color and women. E.g., Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device:
Or, Do You Really Want to be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1222 (1991); Linda S. Greene,
Tokens, Role Models and Pedagogical Polities Lamentations of an African-American Female Law
Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1991); Lani Guinier, Of Gentlemen and Role Models, 6
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 93 (1991).
26. For a classic treatment of the role of neutrality in constitutional adjudication, see Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959). For a
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"You mean the one sponsored by the conservative organization?" I
interjected.
"Yes, that one. I've been struggling with a way to articulate just what's
wrong with neutrality. It seems logical to think that a society that sets out
scrupulously to treat Blacks and whites alike in every setting-jobs, housing,
education, credit, and the like-should have no discrimination. Yet it obvi-
ously doesn't work that way."
"Rodrigo, I know you're widely read. But possibly you don't know that
a number of us in the Critical Race Theory movement have been saying just
that: Mainstream jurisprudence's neutrality is bogus, a mask, a cover.27 In
feminist theory, Catharine MacKinnon has been saying the same thing-
that the law's procedural regularity, its emphasis on 'legality,' serves to con-
ceal and legitimate an antiwoman bias.28 So, your observation, while trench-
ant, is not particularly novel, although in light of your recent experience I
can see why you are preoccupied with it. Would you like me to refer you to
some things to read?" I reached for the four books on the corner of my desk
and began mentally composing a short additional reading list that would get
Rodrigo started. In a moment, I regretted my offer.
"I've read those," Rodrigo replied levelly. "And I've read you, and Bell,
and MacKinnon, and Freeman, and many others on this subject. But I want
to go further."
I could feel the blood rushing into the tiny capillaries in my face. I
should have known better than to patronize Rodrigo. If not two steps ahead
of me, he's almost always at my own level.
"What do you mean, 'go further'?" I asked quickly, in part to cover my
own gaffe, but also because I very much wanted to hear his thoughts. Per-
haps Rodrigo could help me discover a way to incorporate the four books I
had been struggling with into my teaching materials.
"Many Critical Race Theorists condemn neutrality and color-blindness
as merely maintaining the racial advantage of whites. But, aside from
presenting the 'playing field' or 'starting line' analogy, they offer little expla-
nation of why this is so. ''29
"The coffee's almost ready. I assume you have some thoughts about
this?"
"I do."
"I'd love to hear them. Let me wash out these cups."
rigorous reexamination of this position, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-
Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991).
27. See, eg., Bell, pp. 2-14, 89-108; DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW
(3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter BELL, RACE, RACISM] (arguing that neutral race-remedies law maintains
white supremacy); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis-
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978);
Gotanda, supra note 26.
28. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCouRSEs ON LIFE AND LAW
(1989); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
29. Both of these analogies demonstrate that because of whites' historical advantages, special
provisions must be made for minorities, otherwise whites will prevail in most competitions.
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I. IN WHICH RODRIGO EXPLAINS How NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DISADVANTAGE BLACKS AND OTHER
OUTSIDER GROUPS
When I returned, Rodrigo was leafing through one of the books on my
desk. 30
"I must correct myself," he said. "I haven't read this one. It looks like
it's still in manuscript form."
"It is," I confirmed. "The author, Professor Spann, was kind enough to
supply me with an advance copy. It's an expansion of his earlier Michigan
Law Review article."
"Pure Politics?"31 Rodrigo asked. "I read that article. I thought it was
brilliant. He urges Black people to abandon their excessive and misplaced
reliance on the Supreme Court as an instrument of social progress, and to
concentrate instead on 'pure politics'-the employment of mass force and
influence through marches and protests, as well as elections and representa-
tive government.32 Is that what his new book is about?"
"That and more."
'33
"And does he explain what it is about the Supreme Court's fascination
with neutrality that causes it to hand down one hurtful decision after
another?"
"Not in the version of the manuscript that I have."
"That's disappointing," Rodrigo lamented. "None of the good leftist
scholars seem to have addressed that question. And the right-wingers," Ro-
drigo continued, gesturing toward two of the books on my desk, 34 "agree
that the courts haven't been able to initiate sweeping social change. But,
unlike the folks on the left, they're not upset about that; they think it's the
way things should be. In their view, a neutralist, quietist Supreme Court is
simply performing its assigned role in our political system."
"So, both sides agree on the effects of 'neutral' jurisprudence. Left and
Critical writers view the Supreme Court's failure to do more to benefit peo-
ple of color with outrage; they consider our system's noble promises of
equality a sham.35 And more conservative judges and writers see the same
thing, but celebrate, since, according to them, that's the way courts should
behave." 36
30. The book was Girardeau Spann's Race Against the Court
31. Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1990).
32. Id. at 1990-2007, 2012-18, 2022-30.
33. As noted earlier, Spann's work presents a devastating indictment of the Supreme Court's
role as articulator of antiracist values and policies. See text accompanying notes 10-15 supra.
34. The two books were Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope and David Savage's Turning
Right In this statement, Rodrigo might be said to mischaracterize these works. Rosenberg is better
described as a centrist whose book, though ultimately supportive of the conservative view of the role
of the courts and sponsored by a conservative organization, purports to be nonideological. Savage's
book is a study of the emergence of a conservative majority on the Supreme Court.
35. Eg., Spann, pp. iv-vi, 30-34, 180-204, 262-78, 293-97.





As I mulled over Rodrigo's observation, I noticed that my coffeemaker
had stopped making noise. "Ready for a cup?" I asked, rising from my
chair. Rodrigo nodded enthusiastically. I poured two mugfuls of steaming
espresso and handed one to Rodrigo. Sitting back down, I urged Rodrigo,
"So tell me what you think causes this situation. In a way, it is paradoxical,
isn't it? I mean, if a legal system sincerely sets out to treat a person of color
and a white man exactly the same in every situation that counts, this should
in the long-run produce something like rough equality, shouldn't it?"37
"But it's impossible to assume away the short-run," Rodrigo countered.
"African-Americans and whites live in vastly different circumstances, as we
discussed last time.38 I think the reason for the paradox has to do with the
unspoken background against which people make all of these ostensibly neu-
tral decisions."
"In other words," I mused, "are you saying that the various deci-
sionmakers-employers, apartment managers, admissions committees, and
so on-strive to decide fairly, but carry around subconscious biases that
make it impossible to be truly impartial?39 Charles Lawrence says some-
thing like that; he argues that everyone in American society harbors uncon-
scious racism that manifests itself in a myriad of ways." 4
"I think Lawrence is right, but the problem is broader than that."
"In what way?" I asked, setting down my mug and leaning forward in
my chair.
Rodrigo took a deep gulp of coffee. "In our society, even a deci-
sionmaker with the most pristine racial conscience, one without a trace of
prejudice against minorities, would still end up making decisions adverse to
candidates of color. It has more to do with the cultural background against
which legal criteria are applied than with any sort of overt antiminority
conspiracy."
"What do you mean by cultural background? Do you mean our people's
exclusion from informal networks, sources of information-that sort
of thing?" I had heard this argument before and thought it had some
validity.41
"That's part of it," Rodrigo replied. "But there's more. Legal and cul-
tural decisions are made against a background of assumptions, interpreta-
tions, and implied exceptions, things everyone in our culture understands
37. The concept of the "long-run" incorporates the assumption that sufficient time has passed
to allow any differences in initial starting points to disappear. See note 29 supra and accompanying
text.
38. Delgado, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle, supra note 18 (discussing HACKER, supra note 18, at
93-103, 109-32, 134-78, which describes with stark clarity many of these differences).
39. On unconscious racism, see Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec-
tion: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
40. Id. at 339-44 (pointing out the ways in which unconscious racism informs acts which
might appear neutral on the surface).
41. E.g., Greene, supra note 25; Guinier, supra note 25.
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but which seldom, if ever, get expressed explicitly."'42
"And I suppose you are going to say that all those assumptions favor
whites?"
"Of course. And they have at least as much efficacy as does law on the
books."
43
"Could you give me an example?" I persisted. "It still seems to me that
if every relevant decisionmaker sets out to treat two individuals, A and B,
identically even though one is white and the other Black, then we have
achieved formal equality. "How," I asked with a wry smile, "can a system
like this possibly disadvantage minorities?"
"Take a different kind of promise," Rodrigo said, eyeing my coffee
machine. The young wunderkind set a fast pace; I was happy to see he
needed fuel from time to time, too.
"Like another cup?"
"In a minute. Let's say that a father promises his son a trip to the ice
cream parlor if the child cleans up his room. The child says, 'No matter
what?' The father answers, 'Sure.' So the child cleans up his room, but the
father never ends up taking him out for the ice cream."
"Hmm," I murmured, turning the hypothetical over in my mind. "I
suppose the father had an excuse of some sort?" I recalled with no small
measure of guilt times in my own life as a parent when I had done something
similar.
"Right. The father says, 'You couldn't have thought that I meant that
you had three whole days just to clean that little room.' Or, the day after the
promise, the local ice cream parlor goes out of business, and the nearest shop
is an hour away. Or, the father loses his job. Or, the car develops engine
trouble or suffers some other mishap and has to go to the garage, and the
only way to get the cone would be for the two to take a $10 cab ride. Or,
the child develops a milk allergy. It turns out, then, that the father's prom-
ise assumed dozens of conditions, implied exceptions, and unstated excuses.
Although the father never spelled these out, he insists the child must have
known of them. The same sort of unstated conditions underlie our society's
promises of racial equality."
"So, you are saying that just as all the terms of the argument favor the
father, mostly white decisionmakers construe the interpretational structure
in a manner which inevitably favors whites and disadvantages nonwhites in
situations like the ones we've been talking about? And they do this, you're
42. Eg., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060
(1991); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Private Clubs and Public Judges: A Nonsubstantive Debate About Sym-
bols, 59 TEx. L. REv. 733 (1980); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea
for Narrative, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2411 (1989); Mar J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple
Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RIrS. L. REP. 7 (1989).
43. Writers in an early Critical movement that originated at the University of Wisconsin in the
middle years of the century used the term "law on the books" to designate the system of formal legal
rules-a system they regarded as less interesting and often less efficacious than the system of "law in
action." See, eg., David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36
STAN. L. REv. 575 (1984).
Apri 1993] 1141
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
saying, not because they're biased, consciously or unconsciously, but rather
because they're fully acculturated members of society?"
"Exactly!" Rodrigo replied with animation that I didn't think was en-
tirely caused by the high caffeine content of my mocha java beans, obtained
from a new supplier. "Imagine an African-American applies for a job on the
faculty of an institution like yours. The only other candidate for the position
is white. The hiring committee declares its intention to use only scrupu-
lously race-neutral criteria.""4
"Yet, the white gets the position, right?"
"Yes. Even though the two candidates went to the same law school, got
the same grades-you name it-a difference will emerge, and that difference
is not part of the formal, written criteria. One turns out to have a more
pleasant demeanor than the other. The white strikes the hiring committee as
better at 'small talk.' The white has more seniority, more 'solid' job experi-
ence, better 'communication skills,' or a stronger recommendation from a
better-known professor. It turns out that new 'merit' criteria just happen to
favor the white applicant. None of these requirements was mentioned in the
formal job description circulated or advertised by the employer. 45
"Yet everyone knows they're there. The formal, 'on the books' rule-the
only one explicitly stated-looks magnificently fair: 'Treat blacks and
whites exactly the same.' But the cultural backdrop skews the application of
the rule, producing discriminatory results," I summarized. "I bet you think
this explains why the LL.M. skit got you into trouble, while those students
who put on the main event got off unpunished."
"Exactly," Rodrigo replied. "There turned out to be an implied excep-
tion to the rule that satires are acceptable.4 6 Free speech reigns unless you
poke fun at certain things or cause a wealthy alum to put his checkbook
away."p
"I'm sure he will reconsider once the fuss dies down. Alums love having
their names prominently displayed on buildings, classrooms, and lounges
throughout the law school. It reminds them of the good old days."
"Even if the law school is changing-if the composition of the student
body and faculty is radically different from the way he remembers?" 47
pressed Rodrigo.
"You may have a point. But in all fairness, I think the original skitsters
would have earned retribution, too, if their program caused a rich alum to
revoke a donation." I stopped, realizing I was uncomfortably close to taking
44. For the view that few law schools achieve this goal of equal consideration, see BELL, AND
WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 2, at 140-61 (chronicle of the "seventh candidate," dealing with
law faculty hiring).
45. See Aleinikoff, supra note 42 (culture skews perception); Delgado, Rodrigo's Third Chroni-
cle, supra note 18; Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 716-21.
46. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (stating general rule that satire
directed at a public figure qualifies for First Amendment protection).
47. See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 2, at 143 (addressing alumni uneasiness
with demographic shifts within contemporary law schools).
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on the role of apologist for the system. Was I losing my own critical edge?
I had a birthday coming up, and this had been on my mind for a while.
Rodrigo shot me an appraising look so I backtracked slightly. "I do
agree with you that in this case there is a propensity to apply the 'boys will
be boys' excuse, and not the other. The school's reaction does seem more
than a little harsh."
"Maybe I'll have my friend Ali write a letter asking him to reconsider-
the donor, I mean. Ali's a great conciliator and has a gift for words. Maybe
he can remind the wealthy philanthropist that the true test of a great law
school lies in its ability to withstand vigorous criticism, and that the LL.M.
skit simply confirmed his old school's greatness."
"I'm sure it wouldn't hurt your job chances if you and he were success-
ful," I added.
Rodrigo was silent for a while. Then, returning to his critique of neutral-
ity, he posed another hypothetical: "Maybe this is a way to explain it. Im-
agine that a lawn treatment chemical turns out to be virulently poisonous.
The suburbs disappear. Overnight, white people become a minority who
must now deal with Blacks (and other racial minorities) from a position of
weakness. A long tradition of Black subculture holds that one may freely
disparage and ridicule anyone who is a 'jerk.' 48 The definition of 'jerk' is a
person who is naive, slow at sports, bad at repartee, lacking in street
smarts. 49 A whole culture of songs, myths, stories, and the like derides peo-
ple who fit this description. Let's suppose that unflattering concept just hap-
pens to be associated, fairly or unfairly, with people who have light skins. Is
there any doubt that in the new regime, white people would come out sec-
ond-best, even if they were just as talented, smart, deserving, and motivated
as members of the new majority group?"50
"A vivid example, if a little far-fetched," I replied. "Whites would end
up second-best even if Blacks set out to treat them fairly, humanely, and
even-handedly. The background assumptions would cause them to lose out
in the race for jobs, slots in law school classes, and so on, even if all the rules
were colorblind."
I flipped the switch on the coffee warmer to "On." "But let's return to
the world at hand. Much of the action these days concerns retributive, not
48. Most groups, of course, including the dominant one, use disparaging terms to focus anger,
contempt, or dislike on members of other groups. See CAROL ROSEN, MAYBE HE'S JUST A JERK
(1992); Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989); Richard Delgado,
Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 133, 133-49 (1982); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in
American Law and Culture Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1258, 1282-83 (1992).
49. This concept of a "jerk" is an example of a language game. Conceived by Ludwig Wittgen-
stein, the notion of a language game focuses attention not on words' core or "essential" meanings or
definitions but on their multiple, sometimes overlapping, uses. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 9-25 (D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinnes trans., 2d ed., Routledge
& Kegan Paul 1974) (1921).
50. For a somewhat different depiction of a racial reversal of fortunes, see BELL, AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 2, at 162-77 ("Chronicle of the Amber Cloud").
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distributive justice. White society has already figured out, to its own satis-
faction at least, how to go about distributing jobs and other benefits to
Blacks-namely, very stintingly.5 1 But.the attention is now beginning to
focus on the remedial aspects of civil rights strategy--on what society should
do, in light of its past mistreatment of Blacks.5 2 How does your 'cultural
background' argument work here, Rodrigo?"
"In much the same way," Rodrigo confidently replied, rising and walk-
ing over to my coffeemaker. "May I?"
"Of course. The sugar and creamer are over there."
Rodrigo poured himself a second cup, while I marveled at his youthful
constitution. "If you want decaffeinated, I can brew some," I offered.
Rodrigo made a face and returned to his chair, where he began gulping
his steaming-hot high-octane. "Implied exceptions arise in this setting, too.
Any remedy for past discrimination must not be too costly to whites.53 So-
called 'innocent' whites may not be made to pay the penalty for past injus-
tices.54 Decrees may not bind whites who are not members of a class before
the court.55 Discrimination is not redressable unless an intent to discrimi-
nate can be proven.5 6 Harms are not compensable unless tight chains of
causation are shown.5 7 Standing rules limit who may complain.5 8 And so
on."
"So, essentially what you're saying is that the dominant culture has
somehow managed to take the sting out of any and all available remedies?" I
asked.
"Right," Rodrigo responded.
"You know, Rodrigo," I said thoughtfully, "I think you may be onto
something. Many of us Critical Race Theorists have written about the way
in which the costs of racial remedies always seem to be placed on Blacks-
51. Derrick Bell's Faces at the Bottom of the Well analyzes the societal allocation of benefits to
African-Americans. For a description and analysis of the current retrenchment in civil rights, see
Savage, pp. 361- 420; Linda S. Greene, Race in the 21st Century: Equality Through Law?, 64 TUL L.
REv. 1515 (1990).
52. E.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (minority set-aside held
unconstitutional because city failed to show that its plan was narrowly tailored to remedy specific
past discrimination that was not redressable through race-neutral means).
53. Derrick Bell has been one of the chief critics of this view. See, eg., Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,
Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REv. 3 (1979);
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv.
L. Rnv. 518, 523 (1979); cf Bell, pp. 89-108 (discussing racial realism).
54. For a discussion of the role of innocence, see Delgado, supra note 25, at 1224.
55. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62, 765, 768 (1989), superseded by statute Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981
(West Supp. 1992)).
56. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40, 242, 245 (1976); Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West Supp. 1992)). But see Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
57. E.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
332-33 (1986); see Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VIIAction"
A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292, 292-93, 304-10 (1982).
58. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751-61,,766 (1984).
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the faces at the bottom of the well. 59 Your insight helps explain why this
happens."
Rodrigo drained his cup. "Neutral rules rarely detect many breaches of
the principle of nondiscrimination," 6 Rodrigo continued. "And, when
breaches are detected, those violations are remedied in as innocuous a way as
possible, one that does not significantly disturb the prevailing social
order."
61
"How does partisan politics affect all of this? Do you think it makes
much difference whether the conservatives or the liberals are in power?"
"Not much," Rodrigo answered. "Partisan distinctions may be impor-
tant in other areas, such as economic policy or foreign relations, but they
make little difference for minorities. Both liberals and conservatives cham-
pion neutrality in antidiscrimination law, as though treating Blacks and
whites exactly the same will make discrimination go away. But as we have
seen, it won't. We fare no better under one regime than the other. For us,
political labels are merely deflections from the issues."' 62
"I'm not sure I'd go that far, Rodrigo," I asserted, "even though I agree
that neutrality is flawed. Obviously, rules dictating equal treatment of mi-
norities and whites can't redress longstanding discrimination. But you must
admit, such rules are better than the old blatantly racist ones. 63 Perhaps
they are way stations to something better. Don't you agree?"
"Maybe," Rodrigo replied somewhat skeptically. "The danger though is
in complacency. Since minorities and whites are now definitionally equal
under the law, we can tell ourselves that that problem is solved. We can
even blame the victim. 4 For, if after four decades of scrupulously neutral
legal rules, African-Americans and other people of color are still poor,
marginalized, and discontent-well, what can be done? 'The problem can-
not be our fault,' the argument goes, 'since we've put in place all these won-
derful legal rules which mandate equal treatment. If they haven't been able
to prosper with such rules in place, then the problem must lie with them.
Right? They must be shiftless, or immoral, or not very smart.' ",65
"I recognize this danger. In fact, I've actually written along somewhat
similar lines myself."
59. Eg., Bell, pp. 101-04; see also note 53 supra.
60. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
61. See text accompanying notes 54-55 & 59 supra.
62. See Richard Delgado, Zero-Based Racial Politics: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case Argu-
ments on Behalf of the Nonwhite Underclass, 78 GEO. L.J. 1929, 1929-30 (1990).
63. For a description of the old regime of separate but equal schools, whites-only drinking
fountains, Jim Crow laws, and of course, slavery, see BELL, RACE, RACISM, supra note 27, at 2-63.
See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERI-
CAN LEGAL PROCESS (1978); JENNIFER S. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA (1984);
KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH
(1956).
64. See Freeman, supra note 27, at 1054, 1103; Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology
of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923, 942-43 (1988) (reviewing DEREK
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987)).
65. See note 64 supra; Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, supra note 18, at 1374.
April 1993] 1145
STANFORD LAW REVIEWV
"I know," Rodrigo said with an impatience I found almost charming
because of his youth. "And even those of good will, those who don't blame
us, end up distracted from the reality of minorities' plight by the rhetoric of
neutrality, and are led off into another direction. With formal legal equality,
Brown v. Board of Education,66 and the principle of nondiscrimination now
in everyone's consciousness, the focus shifts to the courts. Everyone asks
whether Brown was a justified decision, whether it was principled or not.
Everyone talks earnestly about the proper judicial role, about whether courts
can or should be in the business of propelling legal change."
'67
Rodrigo gestured toward Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope, one of
the books on my desk. "A prime example! Instead of writing about Blacks
and their predicament, everyone writes about courts-on law and the appro-
priate judicial function. We start out writing about racial wrongs, about
racial justice. But, we end up writing about ourselves. It's a neat shift."
"Traditional legal scholarship seems much more concerned with proce-
dure, the way one should go about solving a problem-rather than actually
solving it.68 It's probably a universal human tendency."
"Perhaps so," Rodrigo replied. "The problem is how African-Ameri-
cans, a group that was brought here in chains, can achieve retributive justice.
Yet we end up talking about legal principles. We endiessly discuss whether
some deviation from perfect formal equality is principled, whether some pal-
try affirmative action program benefiting a handful of African-Americans
can be justified.69 How can we ever hope to achieve justice when these are
what we're calling the burning issues of race. These issues are much more
absorbing-not to mention less guilt-inspiring-because they are about us."
"Well, Rodrigo, I must admit I find your analysis intriguing, particularly
the way you tie your ideas back to neutrality as the source of the trouble. Is
this what you are writing about for your seminar paper: the one you plan to
submit to the second competition?"
"Yes. I'm thinking of focusing on the dichotomy between equality of
opportunity and equality of results. I'm sure the conservative sponsors will
appreciate that."
"Bravo," I responded, with a trace of amusement. "Conservatives love
equal opportunity as much as they hate equal results. In their view, the first
is principled, neutral, and fair, while the second is unprincipled, result-
66. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
67. See Gotanda, supra note 26 (discussing color-blindness); Wechsler, supra note 26 (discuss-
ing neutrality); see also RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 147-266 (1992) (urging abandonment of race-conscious laws and
programs).
68. For a similar observation, see Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a
Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. Rxv. 561, 568-69, 576 (1984). But see Randall L.
Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1792-93 (1989) (arguing
that, although certainly not the only issue, procedural issues are important to race relations law).
69. For the view that affirmative action programs actually aid middle class Blacks instead of
the more needy lower-class Blacks, see STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION BABY 71-84, 94, 233 (1991); Delgado, supra note 25.
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oriented, and wrong.70 You will definitely get their attention, particularly if
you can manage to present a new angle. Have you thought about how you
are going to link it up with your insight about neutrality as a sham
guarantee?"
71
"That's the trick," Rodrigo answered, a bit pensively. "I've got a few
ideas, though. Can I tell you about them over dinner?"
"Sounds good," I said. "I'm starved. My doctor told me not to go too
long between meals."
"I'll pay this time," Rodrigo offered.
"Don't be ridiculous. I owe you. You've helped me figure out how to
incorporate those four books into the new edition of my casebook. Plus, I
make more money than you."
"An odd definition of neutrality, Professor. Why don't we go Dutch?"
"Okay, okay, if you insist," I conceded.
II. IN WHICH RODRIGO AND I Discuss EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
VERSUS EQUALITY OF RESULTS
About an hour later, Rodrigo and I found ourselves comfortably en-
sconced in a plain but comfortable Mexican restaurant in the meat-packing
district that my friend Jose Oliveros had introduced me to the last time he
was in town. I was struck that Rodrigo, who had been raised in Italy and
only been back in the States a short time, knew to order Dos Equis beer with
his meal. After the waiter disappeared with our orders, Rodrigo continued
our earlier conversation.
"As I mentioned earlier, I'm thinking of using the two types of equality,
equality of opportunity and equality of result, as my principal illustration of
the problems with neutrality."
"A good choice. Do you intend to argue that they merge, that they con-
stitute a false dichotomy?" I worried that my young friend might have
fallen prey to the influence of the deconstruction movement, a movement
whose main goal, so far as I could determine, is to show that polar opposites
collapse into each other upon close inspection.72 I hoped Rodrigo was not
going to take me on a tour of Continental theory. I didn't feel up to it-at
least before we had a bite to eat. Fortunately, my fears proved groundless.
"No, although I suspect one could do that," Rodrigo replied. "I'm
thinking of doing something more along the lines of a social and conceptual
inquiry."
Relieved, I prodded: "I've always been struck by the way conservatives
70. CARTER, supra note 69, at 230-32; SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER:
A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA 111-25 (1990) (criticizing result or quota oriented affirmative
action programs).
71. See notes 35-36, 38-50 supra and accompanying text.
72. On the critique of liberalism as incoherent and riddled with contradictions, see, for exam-
ple, Jamie Boyle, Critical Legal Studies: A Young Person's Guide (1989) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Stanford Law Review).
April 1993] 1147
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
favor equality of opportunity over the other kind. If they were genuinely
committed to neutrality, you would think that equal results would be the
logical way to measure the effectiveness of racial programs. Have you a the-
ory for why conservatives---and many liberals, too-have such an aversion
to equality of results?"
"I do," Rodrigo declared, pausing for a moment as the waiter set down
our drinks. I resolved merely to sip my own Dos Equis until dinner arrived.
I could see the outlines of a new subsection of my book forming, and wanted
to remain alert. I made a mental note to figure out some way of giving
Rodrigo credit. Maybe an effusive footnote would suffice for now. Later,
when he got his first teaching position, I'd take him on as co-author, I
mused. He certainly had more energy than I did these days, and these revi-
sions were becoming increasingly tedious.
As though reading my mind, Rodrigo offered: "You or I might want to
do something with this notion sometime. To my knowledge, no one has
really addressed it. It is truly amazing, when you think about it, how all
the leftists and civil rights activists, like yourself, prefer equality of results,
while those of moderate or conservative persuasion prefer equality of
opportunity. '7
3
"You said you had a theory for this ideological preference?"
"Well, I think it has to do with one's perspective, one's baseline. If you
start out from a certain position, a given practice will look neutral. From a
different perspective, the same practice will look one-sided, biased, unfair.
For example, look at the quota issue. It's no secret that most conservatives
dislike quotas for Blacks and other minority groups.74 Such schemes strike
them as radically unfair, because they assure that a certain number of minor-
ities will get jobs. Imposition of a quota seems nonneutral, because whites
are treated differently from nonwhites.75 Without the quotas, that number
would, no doubt, be much smaller. But that, in large part, is because in the
absence of quotas the job criteria operate to hire artificially low numbers of
Black and minority applicants. Genuinely equal treatment will strike some
whites as unfair. Apparently, only advantage-a tilted playing field or crite-
ria that favor them-seems neutral and normal. So, with any new arrange-
ment we look to see who benefits, who is advantaged or disadvantaged, and
pronounce regimes fair or unfair accordingly."
73. With equality of opportunity, one never knows if one has achieved complete fairness; with
equality of result, one simply notices whether one has achieved one's preselected measure or not.
74. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Affirmative Action Fans Who Applaud Wygant May Be Misguided,
NAT'L L.J., June 9, 1986, at 13 (calling Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 478 U.S. 1014 (1986), a
victory for those who favor color-blind jurisprudence); George Will, Bush's Blunder on Racial Schol-
arships, NEWSDAY, Dec. 27, 1990, at 95; see also Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers
and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312, 1320 (1986) (citing conservatives opposition to quota
schemes). Two Supreme Court decisions have struck down minority preference schemes of different
types. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
75. See THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALrTY? 37-60 (1984); STEELE,
supra note 70, at 121-22; Abram, supra note 74, at 1319-20.
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"I'm still not sure I understand why everyone resists equality of result.
Is it merely because such an approach is likely to provide more jobs and
benefits to minorities?"
"Well, in part, but the mechanism is a little more complicated. Notice
how equality of opportunity is a much more nonformal, multifactorial mea-
sure than equality of results.76 The latter kind of equality is starkly simple.
You merely compare the number of minorities and whites at a job site, for
example. But with equality of opportunity, many things come into play.
This multiplies the opportunity for cultural factors to have an effect."
"By 'cultural factors' you mean the host of background assumptions, in-
terpretations, and implied exceptions that we discussed earlier?" 77
"Yes. Neutrality works best when it is able to call up and rely on as
many of these culturally inscribed routines and understandings as possible.
These understandings, 'read' into the culture long ago, now seem objective,
unchallengeable, and true.78 I mean things like the merit principle, the idea
that informed consent should insulate a doctor from malpractice liability, or
the impression that 'objective' standards for consumer warnings are some-
how more fair than subjective standards."' 79
"Women have been pointing out something similar in connection with
date rape, urging that consent be examined from a more searching perspec-
tive than 'What would most men think in this situation?' "80
"And I think it's the same general idea. After we inscribe our ideas of
power, authority, and legitimacy into the culture, we then pretend to consult
that culture, meekly and humbly, in search of justice-for rules that are fair
and neutral. A neat trick if you can get away with it."81
Rodrigo paused, since the waiter had arrived with our food. Realizing
that our long conversation had made us hungry, in unspoken agreement we
ate for a few moments in silence. Rodrigo attacked his chile relleno with
gusto, while I examined my burrito for anything forbidden by my doctor-a
list that seemed to get longer and longer each time I visited her.
After his appetite subsided, Rodrigo continued: "So the nonformal na-
ture of equality of opportunity allows members of an empowered group to
call upon and invoke the many culturally established routines, practices, and
understandings that benefit them."
76. See Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee & David Hubbert, Fairness
and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L.
REv. 1359, 1367, 1374, 1394 (using "nonformal" to mean embracing a large amount of relevant
information).
77. See text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
78. For a similar argument, see Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 COR-
NELL L. REv. 813, 817-21 (1992) (legal rules replicate social power, demonstrated through examples
of medical informed consent, date rape, and cigarette warnings).
79. Id. at 819-21.
80. Id.; see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Pornography and Harm to Women: "No
Empirical Evidence?", 53 OHIo ST. L.J. 1037 (1992) (using examples of antipornography move-
ment).
81. Delgado, supra note 78, at 817-23.
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"Could you give me an example?"
"Sure. Take our earlier one of the law school that can only hire one
professor.82 There are two finalists, a Black and a white. The formal job
description contains the standard criteria: potential for scholarship, teach-
ing, and public service. The two finalists seem equally qualified in each of
those respects. Equality of results would dictate that the Black applicant get
the job because of the small number of African-Americans on the faculty.
That is, the approach would strive for equality, for proportional representa-
tion, or some similar measure. But as we discussed before, under equality of
opportunity the white will inevitably get the position. Equality of opportu-
nity only guarantees that both will receive initial consideration. And when
both candidates are considered, a myriad of factors, some conscious, some
unconscious will come into play: inflection, small talk, background, bearing,
social class, and the many imponderables that go into evaluating 'collegial-
ity.'8 3 Critical Race Theory argues, and the battle for civil rights demon-
strates, that such a regime is exactly the opposite of fair and neutral.
Prudent distrust of a decisionmaker who judges persons of a different race
suggests that formal, structured rules and strictly confined discretion are the
key to just such decisions. 84 But that is the opposite of what we have."
"Or take cases of pay increase and promotion," I suggested. "Formal
equality says pay and promote minorities the same as whites doing the same
work. But, in practice, this formal rule turns out to have exceptions that are
applied in accordance with cultural understandings. The white candidate
got a higher test score.85 So, following the rule of equal treatment would be
unfair to the white. The next time, the two candidates have exactly the same
test score. Again, the white gets the promotion-this time because he or she
had more seniority,86 or a 'richer' job background, or better references. And
so it goes."
"In each case," Rodrigo interjected, "society manages to avoid the strict-
equality rule. And the reason is the same: Some unstated cultural under-
standing or premise comes into play. So, the more empowered person whose
predecessors were in a position to dictate the cultural terms for these trans-
actions invariably comes out ahead."'8
7
82. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
83. For an explanation of how these factors can be manipulated into evidence justifying a
"pool is so small" defense, see Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1872,
1876 (1990).
84. For a discussion of the role of distrust in legal theory, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1978); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Adminis-
trative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1209 (1970).
85. On bias in standardized tests, see TOWARDS A DIVERSIFIED LEGAL PROFESSION: AN IN-
QUIRY INTO THE LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST, GRADE INFLATION, AND CURRENT ADMISSIONS
POLICIES (David H. White ed., 1981); Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT Narrative and Bias, I AM. U.
J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 1993).
86. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 571-72, 575, 577 (1984)
(discussing seniority as an implied component of job-desert).
87. Delgado, supra note 78, at 817-21. For a somewhat different argument based on structural
considerations, see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 95, 123-25 (1974).
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"So, equality of opportunity really just amounts to affirmative action for
whites," I interjected. "It builds in a background of unstated assumptions
that confer a consistent advantage in all the competitions that matter. If
society were serious about equality, it would abolish this way of doing things
and opt for equality of results. But this is something our culture will never
do."
"No," Rodrigo added quietly. "It has defined equal opportunity, the ap-
proach which permits its members to win, as legal, principled, and just.88 If
one were to devise a system that would, first, produce racially discrepant
results, and, second, enable those who manage and benefit from the system
to sleep well at night, it would look very much like the present one."
' 89
"A serious charge, Rodrigo," I cautioned. "Not every member of the
majority group merits that indictment. Some well-wishers and sympathizers
want us to succeed. When you go out on the hiring market, you will see
that. Perhaps even now, you have found a professor or two of majority race
who has adopted and encouraged you, recognized your talent, gone out of
his or her way on your behalf."
"Perhaps," Rodrigo conceded. "But not even they fully understand the
personal impact of racism.90 Most sympathetic whites view our current civil
rights laws and regulations as adequate. The only thing missing, they be-
lieve, is the will to enforce them consistently."
"Isn't there something to that?" I prodded. "Or, what if we simply
retooled the current rules to exclude the type of favoritism you mentioned?91
Then, would you view the system as fair?"
"I'm skeptical," responded Rodrigo. "Such 'retooling' would entail the
majority group's agreement to relinquish its advantages. They would have
to agree to abide by quite complex rules, nothing as simple as: 'Treat Blacks
And Whites the Same.' But, even if they did agree, rules alone cannot rem-
edy racism."
"And why is that?"
"Because of the nature of racism itself. It's a little hard to explain. I'm
working on this part of my thesis right now. Would you mind listening and
giving me some feedback?"
"I'd be pleased to. I'm certain I'll benefit from discussing it at least as
much as you will. Unfortunately, all I've been doing lately is cutting up case
reports and reading and summarizing books. Never write a casebook, Ro-
drigo. It saps your energy and creativity like nothing else."
Since we had finished our dinner, Rodrigo suggested: "Maybe we could
88. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988) (describing the legitimation
function of the law of race remedies); Freeman, supra note 27 (same).
89. Delgado, supra note 64, at 924, 929-47.
90. For a discussion of the disparity in the quantity of racism that persons of different ethnici-
ties perceive, see Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 48, at 1282-84.
91. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
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talk about it over dessert? I've heard that there's a wonderful bistro not far
from here."
"Good idea. Here comes the waiter." I gestured that we would like to
pay our bill, and moments later we were walking down the deserted side-
street, past warehouses and giant tractor-trailers full (I imagined) of sides of
beef.
As we walked, Rodrigo began.
III. IN WHICH RODRIGO EXPLAINS RACISM'S REFRACTORY NATURE
IN THE FACE OF LEGAL REGULATION
"We both observed earlier that many recent authors have pointed out
that the current laws don't seem able to make much of a dent in minority
poverty and despair. Rosenberg, as you recall, says as much.92 Savage, too,
points out how the Court is moving steadily away from any suggestion of
social activism. 93 And Spann and Bell seize on these observations to make
their pungent points about the pervasiveness of racism. 94 And they're not
the only ones."
'95
"True, although many conservatives don't find that particularly troub-
ling; for them, judicial quietism is almost an article of faith. Our friends on
the left are outraged, however. Gerry Spann's book all but accuses the
Court of betraying African-Americans' legitimate hopes for decisions that
can eliminate the barriers to Black achievement and empowerment. ' 96
"So, both the left and the right agree that the legal system does little to
redress Black misery."
"I'm afraid so. Now, you said you're working on an explanation for this
sorry state of affairs. Is this in addition to your earlier comments about
neutrality's role in concealing and increasing white privilege?" 97
"Yes. I think that there is something about racism that makes it pecu-
liarly difficult to dismantle through any system of antidiscrimination laws.
Racism would exist even if the dominant group treated minorities and
whites similarly in all settings. Even if society recognized and canceled out
the myriad cultural interpretations and background factors that now give
whites an edge and render equal treatment a hollow illusion, I think racism
would still remain."
"Rodrigo, I've been accused of undue pessimism about the prospects for
racial reform. But it sounds like I soon will have an ally-namely, you!
Please explain your theory about the persistence of racism."
"Facially neutral laws cannot redress most racism, because of the cul-
tural background against which such laws operate. But even if we could
92. See text accompanying notes 5-9 supra.
93. See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
94. See text accompanying notes 1-4, 10-15 supra.
95. See, eg., HACKER, supra note 18, at 3.
96. See, eg., Spann, pp. iv-vi, 30-34, 180-204, 269-78, 293-97.
97. See text accompanying notes 30-71 supra.
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somehow control for this, formally neutral rules would still fail to redress
racism because of certain structural features of the phenomenon itself."
A. Rodrigo's First Structural Reason for Racism's Persistence: Its
Vertical Character
"Rodrigo, slow down a little. My old legs are having trouble keeping up
with you." As Rodrigo's speech became more animated, he had been pick-
ing up his pace as we walked to the bistro where we planned to have coffee
and dessert. I was grateful when Rodrigo slowed.
"Let me start this way. You and others have written about racism's his-
torical character. Everyone knows that Blacks were brought here in slave
ships. The practice of chattel slavery remained in effect for over two centu-
ries, then was replaced by a system of Jim Crow laws and social practices
that continues to this very day. So, racism's roots cannot easily be ignored.
98
Neutral rules cannot do justice to the thickly embedded historical nature of
American prejudice. We act today on a set stage. But the rules ignore this.
They tell the actor not to favor the white over the Black. The only thing the
rules take into account is what happens right now. If the actor-say a
school board commissioner-can truthfully say, 'I acted as I did for no
racial animus,' that is the end of the inquiry.99 This is obviously not suf-
ficient."
"Why not?"
"Let me try to give you an example." Rodrigo squinted into the late
afternoon dusk that enveloped the sidewalk. "Imagine a school board needs
to establish an attendance boundary. All of the children who live on one
side of the boundary will go to one school; the ones who live on the other
side, to another one."
"And you would predict that the board will choose a boundary that
maintains segregated housing patterns, with the practical effect of maintain-
ing segregated schools?"' ' °
"No. This school board truly wants to do the right thing. Recognizing
that some boards have drawn attendance lines reflecting ethnic neighbor-
hoods, this board has no desire to follow suit. Besides, it knows that if it
does, the ACLU might bring suit against it. So, instead they choose an ex-
98. See note 50 supra; see also PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS
(1991) (arguing that racial issues must be interpreted in light of the historical and personal exper-
iences of the oppressed); Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theol-
ogy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. Rxv. 985 (1990) (same).
99. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
100. For a general discussion of housing discrimination, see BELL, RACE, RACIsM, supra note
27, at 685-805; Boris I. Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race
Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962); Rodney A. Smolla, Integration Maintenance: The Unconstitu-
tionality of Benign Programs That Discourage Black Entry to Prevent White Flight, 1981 DUKE L.J.
891; see also City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1987). Butsee Reitman v. Mulken, 387 U.S.
369 (1967) (affirming California Supreme Court's holding that statute allowing discrimination in the
sale of real property violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
April 1993] 1153
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
isting freeway as the dividing line, reasoning that such a boundary will make
the children's walk safer and their walk shorter."
"What the board ignores," I continued, following the logic of Rodrigo's
hypothetical, "is that many years ago the government probably placed the
freeway in that location precisely because minority people lived there. In the
past, governments frequently placed freeways, dump sites, power substa-
tions, and other such undesirable things in minority neighborhoods. 10 1 If
the school board today selects the freeway as the boundary, it gives effect to
a past discriminatory practice. It may do this entirely innocently. Indeed, it
may have a laudable motive, one nobody could quarrel with, of making chil-
dren's walk to school as safe as possible." 10 2
"Exactly."
"In other words," I recapped, "neutrality employs a sort of 'freeze-
frame' approach, looking only at present factors, when redressing racism
requires a longer view."
Rodrigo smiled, "Without that longer view, one misses things, takes ac-
tion that seems innocuous but that actually hurts minority people. There's a
second feature that works in a similar way. Do you think we have time to
discuss it?"
I checked the numbers on the street. "If you can explain it in the course
of two blocks. Otherwise, we'll have to continue inside."
"I'll try my best."
B. Rodrigo's Second Reason: Racism's Concerted, or Horizontal, Aspect
As I had hoped, my ploy caused Rodrigo to slow down. My legs had
begun to complain a second time.
"The other feature is that white-over-Black domination is a concerted
system. Racism derives its efficacy from its insidiousness.1 03 Many whites
don't realize this. They equate racism with isolated, shocking acts such as
lynchings or burning crosses. Most white folks, even ones of good will, per-
ceive much less racism in the world than there actually is.104 In part, that is
because they see fewer acts of out-and-out racism than minorities do.105 But
it is also because they analogize racism to other misfortunes that beset every-
one, regardless of race, like having a flat tire or being cursed by another
driver whom one has inadvertently cut off."' 10 6
"I've noticed that tendency in the controversy over hate speech and uni-
101. See Luke W. Cole, Remediesfor Environmental Racism: A View From the Field, 90 MICH.
L. REv. 1991, 1992 (1992).
102. I am grateful to Pierre Schlag for this example and observation.
103. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 48, at 1282-83; see also Davis, supra note 48, at 1560-64
(describing racism in the context of the New York court system); Delgado, supra note 24, at 383-86
(discussing the pervasive nature of racism, particularly racist speech).
104. Richard Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race-Does the Fundamen-
tal Contradiction Have a Corollary?, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1988); Delgado & Stefancic,
supra note 48, at 1282.
105. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 48, at 1282-83.
106. See, eg., Marjorie Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "Words That Wound" 18
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versity conduct codes," I said. "Many whites fail to realize how often the
victim of one insult is the victim of another, similar one. They analogize it
to being called a 'fool lady driver,' something that might happen every six
months or year, and which rarely threatens an important feature of one's
identity. 10 7 By contrast, persons of color get almost daily reminders of how
different they are. Even my friend Professor Oliveros, a light-skinned His-
panic, reports something similar. He says probably half the people he meets
ask him where he is from, what kind of name he has, or how he learned to
speak English so well."
"The problem involves what you called the 'freeze-frame' approach, Pro-
fessor. Law focuses on micro-transactions, looking for something outra-
geous in a single remark. Not finding anything, it denies the existence of the
underlying racism. And if you do confine your attention to the here and
now in this way, there's not that much difference between 'Back to Africa'
and 'Stay in your lane.' Campus racism, so unremitting that young minority
undergraduates sometimes drop out of college, ends up analogized to a foot-
ball cheer: 'Boo, Cal.'"
"I know academics who have presented similar arguments," I
commented.1
08
"This concerted quality of racism enhances its malevolent efficacy, mak-
ing it an ever-present force even for those of us with high professional status
and wealth. It's as though criminal law were to lack any remedy for conspir-
acy, monopoly, and other offenses of collusion or aggregation, and, instead,
dealt with the underlying evils on a case by case basis."
"Or like trying to identify and avoid poisons by examining their atomic
structure when it's the behavior of the molecule that gives strychnine its
deadly character," I added. "It just doesn't show up at that level."
Stopping at the entrance to the bistro, Rodrigo asked, "Is this the place?"
IV. SUMMARY: IN WHICH RODRIGO WAXES APOCALYPTIC,
EXPLAINING How EVERYTHING WORKS TOGETHER TO
MAINTAIN RACISM'S MALEVOLENT EFFICACY
Entering the dimly lit caf6 and looking around, I observed, "Luckily for
us, it's not very crowded. Have you been here before?"
"No, but Giannina and I have talked about coming here. I've heard they
give free refills, which is great for someone on a student budget. Some of the
other LL.M.s come here, even though it's a long ride."
As we settled down at an empty table, I returned to our earlier discus-
sion: "Your professor urged you to try to solve the 'problems of your peo-
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 585 (1983) (arguing that racist speech that does not constitute harassment
is as protected as other kinds of speech); Strossen, supra note 24, at 489-94 (same).
107. Eg., Delgado, supra note 24, at 383-86; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 48, at 1277-78.
108. Heins, supra note 106, at 591 (employing the slippery-slope argument); Strossen, supra
note 24, at 537-39.
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pie,' as he put it.109 Instead, you seem ready to conclude that those
problems are insoluble. Neutral principles of antidiscrimination law cannot
redress racism.' 10 By defining Blacks and whites as equals, neutrality allows
society to blame Blacks for their predicament."' And, if I've understood
the last part of your thesis, racism's nature makes it peculiarly resistant to
solution through laws like our own.1 2 What a bleak vision for someone so
young! For a battered old crusader like me, taking that stance is under-
standable. I think people give me sympathy for being so downbeat, want to
rush in, comfort me, and say, 'No, it's not so.' But, for you, what's the point
of struggle, what's the point of your working so hard to become a professor
and scholar of civil rights, if you have so little hope of things ever getting
better?"
"I didn't say that things would never get better, Professor. I merely ob-
served that the law would not make them better. Any neutrality-based legal
rule will look depressingly ineffectual to a Black or person of color who lives
in this society. By the same token, any practice that the majority group




"Yes. Our society has been based on racial privilege since its incep-
tion. 114 Formal equality today serves the same purpose as the formal ine-
quality of earlier years. It's a little bit like putting a car into neutral once
you reach a downhill stretch. It just picks up speed; you don't even need to
press the accelerator any more. The difference between society and the car is
that most people don't even notice it's going downhill. So, society has
trouble seeing the racism in a freeway boundary. 15 Civil rights law has de-
volved into a system of 'nots'-'Thou shalt not this,' and 'Thou shalt not
that'-all centered around the relatively few cases society is prepared to de-
nounce as unquestionable breaches of the principle of neutral treatment."
"Like hiring a white high school dropout over a Black Ph.D. and Nobel
Prize laureate."
"Something like that. Members of society are safe, so long as they avoid
those decisions. Nothing in the law requires anyone to do more, to lend a
helping hand, to try to help Blacks find jobs, befriend them, speak to them,
make eye contact with them, help them fix a fiat when they are stranded on
the highway, help them feel like full persons. The law just says, 'Don't set
quotas. Don't discriminate.' How can a system like that change anything?"
109. Delgado, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle, supra note 18.
110. See notes 30-61 supra and accompanying text.
111. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 82-108 supra and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., notes 74-75 supra.
114. See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 2, at 26-42 (imagining the debate over
slavery at the Constitutional Convention); BELL, RACE, RACISM, supra note 27, at 2-63 (providing
an overview of the history of racism against African-Americans); note 63 supra.
115. See notes 99-102 supra and accompanying text.
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"It seems the only positive duties are concerned with capitalism-paying
taxes, registering for the draft, and so on," I observed sardonically.
The waiter arrived, briefly interrupting our conversation to take our or-
der. I was glad for the break. Rodrigo ordered a strawberry torte and
espresso. Mindful of my doctor's orders and the late hour, I asked for a
lemon biscuit and decaffeinated coffee.
As the waiter disappeared, Rodrigo continued: "The negative character
of antidiscrimination laws, along with their inability to deal with the con-
certed and culturally rooted quality of racism, mean that neutral law can't
do much. Moreover, neutrality precludes white folks from seeing how their
own system advantages them, indeed enables their more aggressive elements
to blame minorities for their plight."
The waiter served our coffee. "Given the nature and prevalence of the
cultural background, conservatives and moderates adore neutral rules of a
nonformal character, like those providing for equality of opportunity. Actu-
ally, nothing is intrinsically wrong with neutral rules." I looked up with
surprise. "They could be written and applied from minorities' perspective, in
which case they would do a great deal to redress racism.1 16 But the rules
that minorities would enact, and which would strike them as fair, would
appear one-sided and biased to whites. And whites will use their social
power to label such rules unconstitutional, unprincipled, bad."
"So, do you mean to say that neutrality always fails to redress racism in
practice? If it is applied against a background of minority cultural assump-
tions, it is not politically feasible; if it is applied in the current manner,
against a background of white cultural premises, it fails to achieve retribu-
tive justice for minorities and may even makes matters worse."
"Much worse," Rodrigo nodded. "Whites simultaneously get to blame
the victim, feel relieved of any responsibility for the victim's plight,1 17 and
congratulate themselves on their fair-mindedness. It's no surprise that
under the present legal regime of neutrality, the gap between whites and
Blacks in life expectancy, income, total wealth, educational attainment, in-
fant mortality, and virtually every other indicator of social well-being has
remained roughly the same.11 8 Of course, there has been some improve-
ment. After all, only a few generations ago Blacks were formally en-
slaved.1 1 9 But the economic, social, and political gap between whites and
Blacks manages to remain almost identical decade after decade."
1 20
"This harsh reality pains and embarrasses white liberals, most of whom
don't understand why this disparity continues. But, I think it's fair to say
116. See text accompanying notes 30-71 supra; see also Freeman, supra note 27, at 1052-57
(contrasting "victim" versus "perpetrator" perspective for redressing racial wrongs, and deploring
that the law almost invariably selects the latter viewpoint).
117. See notes 64-67 supra and accompanying text.
11. See, eg., HACKER, supra note 18, at 94-103, 109-78; Delgado, supra note 64, at 930-32.
119. Delgado, supra note 64, at 935-36, 938.
120. See, eg., HACKER, supra note 18, at 94-103, 109-78; Delgado, supra note 64, at 931-32.
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that it no longer seems to bother the conservatives. 121 They embrace the
idea that the courts cannot and should not function as a mechanism for
propelling social change. As we've seen, for them social reform is purely a
legislative function. 122 Or better yet, from us, they expect bootstrapping ef-
forts, economic development, getting a job, tending to our families, and so
on." 12
3
"I've been reading some of those books, too," Rodrigo said. "But I think
the conservatives overlook something when they maintain that the courts
have no efficacy, and that they can and should do little in the area of civil
rights."
The waiter brought our desserts. Hungry again from our brisk walk and
animated discussion, I immediately attacked my lemon biscuit. Looking up,
I challenged Rodrigo: "I'll bite. What are they overlooking."
"Very funny," he replied. "What conservatives overlook is that our sys-
tem of cautious, incremental, negatively-phrased, neutral civil rights laws is
in fact quite efficacious."
"It is?" I questioned incredulously, nearly spilling my decaffeinated cap-
puccino. "In what way?"
"The system works very well. It is just that its successes serve a different
goal. For example, Gerald Rosenberg's book is full of tables, charts, regres-
sion equations, and historical analyses, all demonstrating that Supreme
Court decisions have not brought about changes, for women's or minorities'
rights, that were not already underway. 124 He shows that Roe v. Wade125
did not increase access to abortion 126 and reveals that Brown v. Board of
Education 127 did not enlarge the numbers of Black schoolchildren attending
desegregated schools. 128 But Rosenberg mistakenly concludes that the civil
rights laws have no effect."
"I suppose you are going to say that their effect is too subtle to measure,
that it lies in a symbolic dimension that will take years to make itself
felt?"129
121. The reasons for the existence of the gap are the subject of much debate. See HACKER,
supra note 18, at 14, 20-21, 31, 202, 216-18 (gap due in large part to white attitudes and actions).
But see SOWELL, supra note 75, at 16-17, 21-29 (citing successes of other racial and ethnic groups
with histories of oppression, and arguing that the gap is not necessarily a product of racism);
STEELE, supra note 70, at 14-17 (stressing personal responsibility for status).
122. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
123. See RoY BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM 131-73 (1991) (offering
solutions to society's social ills).
124. Rosenberg, pp. 42-54, 175-201 (comparing pre- and post-Roe figures and trends).
125. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
126. Rosenberg, p. 180, tbl. 6.1 (number of abortions performed both before and after legaliza-
tion); Rosenberg, p. 190, tbl. 6.2 (percentage of hospitals providing abortions); Rosenberg, p. 197,
tbl. 6.4 (total number of abortion providers); Rosenberg, p. 201 (concluding that Roe v. Wade had
little effect on the availability of abortions in United States).
127. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
128. Rosenberg, pp. 42-54 (making similar case for school desegregation and concluding that
Brown v. Board of Education had little effect).




"No, not at all," Rodrigo replied. "Rather, civil rights laws efficiently
and smoothly replicate social reality, particularly Black-white power rela-
tions. They are a little like the thermostat in your home or office. They
assure that there is just the right amount of racism. Too much would be
destabilizing-the victims would rebel. Too little would forfeit important
pecuniary and psychic advantages. 130 So, the existing system of race-
remedies law does, in fact, grant minorities an occasional victory, an occa-
sional Brown v. Board of Education.'3 1 Every now and then, a bigot who
bums a cross or beats a Black youth will be convicted. Particularly in areas
where concessions are not too costly, like voting rights, 32 or media licens-
ing,133 the courts will grant us an occasional breakthrough."
"One of the authors we mentioned, David Savage, points out in his book,
Turning Right, that the Rehnquist Court, even in a period of civil rights
retrenchment, has granted Blacks victories in occasional cases."'
134
"I believe that you and others in the Critical Race Theory movement
have a term for this?" Rodrigo prompted.
"Contradiction-closing cases."'
135
"That's it," Rodrigo replied. "I used to think that this notion verged on
tautology. But now I think there might be something to it. What else ex-
plains such decisions as Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC 136 or United States
v. Fordice 137 in an era in which the Court methodically has been eviscerating
civil rights protection for minorities and women by imposing new burdens of
proof, narrowing standing to sue for class-based relief and requiring tight
claims of causation?"'
138
"Under your theory, then," I reviewed, motioning the waiter to bring the
check, "courts are doing their job. Many of us just misconceive what that
job is. Civil rights proponents still believe that the courts want to stamp out
racial unfairness, that the optimal amount of racism in society is zero. But
it's not. It's a properly low level, maintained by means of neutral rules that
reach little conduct of significance, administered and interpreted by judges
whose experiences ill equip them to understand the nature of the problem
and who dispense 'victories' as parsimoniously as possible. Is that your
thesis?"
"Yes, and I think it operates at the level of cultural assumptions, which
is, after all, its beauty. There is no conscious conspiracy. Liberal whites are
often as blithely ignorant of the workings of the system, as needlessly indig-
130. For a similar argument, see Delgado, supra note 64, at 923-24.
131. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
132. See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
133. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
134. Savage, pp. 334-39, 346. See generally Savage, pp. 305-49 (chapter 9, entitled "The Lib-
erals' Last Surprise").
135. A contradiction-closing case is a legal decision that has the effect of closing the gap be-
tween our ideal of how law, or society, ought to be, and how it actually is.
136. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
137. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
138. See notes 52-57 supra and accompanying text.
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nant as the most rock-ribbed conservative extolling the virtues of our system
of individual achievement, where every person rises or falls on her merits."
"Spann is indignant, too."
"Like others on the left, he began by believing-or at least hoping-that
the system means what it says when it issues those golden promises of equal-
ity. That's why he's so indignant, expressing such a sense of betrayal.' 39 It's
a little like the law of gravity. Rosenberg says civil rights law has failed
because the position of women and minorities has not improved much as a
result of constitutional adjudication. 140 But that's like arguing that the law
of gravity has failed because not everything has fallen. In fact, gravity holds
everything neatly in balance, the sun, the moon, the stars, and the planets.
In that respect it is quite successful, as is our civil rights system."
"So law works," I said, slowly grasping the enormity of what Rodrigo
had just articulated. "But it operates to preserve racial advantage, to main-
tain the status quo."
"Like the law of gravity," Rodrigo repeated, draining the last drop of
espresso from his cup.
CONCLUSION
We soon parted. After watching my hyperkinetic young friend stride
along the sidewalk in the direction of his law school thirty blocks away, I
began my slow walk back to my apartment and yet another session with my
casebook. As I walked, I reflected on our conversation. If culture deter-
mines our interpretation of legal texts and rules, and if racism is woven so
deeply into our cultural fabric that we can hardly notice it, then how can
civil rights laws ever operate to eradicate racism in our culture? What did
Rodrigo mean when he said there might be cause for hope, but not through
law? Perhaps he meant that cultural change might occur, possibly through
some form of direct action, and that would make legal change possible. I
cursed my fate as a casebook writer for having removed me, if only tempo-
rarily, from some of the drama being played out on the pages of the law
reviews. I resolved to get together again with Rodrigo soon. I wanted to
hear how his second essay fared in the competition he had mentioned. But
even more importantly, I wanted to know whether he saw any way out of the
cultural trap whose gloomy outlines he had so remorselessly sketched for my
benefit.
139. See generally notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text (discussing Spann's disenchant-
ment with courts and view that minorities should seek different avenues for the redress of racial
wrongs).
140. Rosenberg, pp. 10-21 (explaining Court's inability to bring about social change, and label-
ing this the "Constrained Court" view).
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